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Abstract The techno-moral scenarios (TMS) approach
has been developed to explore the interplay between tech-
nology, societyandmorality.Focusedonnewandemerging
sciences and technologies, techno-moral scenarios can be
used to inform and enhance public deliberation on the
desirability of socio-technical trajectories. The article pre-
sents an attempt to hybridise this scenario tool,
complementing the focus on ethics with an explicit ac-
knowledgement of the multiple meanings of responsibility
and of the plurality of its regimes, i.e. the institutional
arrangements presiding over the assumption and assign-
ment of responsibilities. We call this integrated technique
‘rTMS’ to stress the continuity with the original technique
and, at the same time, tohighlight the additional elementwe
aim to develop: responsibility. The article describes this
approach and illustrates a loosely standardised procedure
that canbeused toorganiseandconductpublic engagement
workshops based on rTMS.
Keywords Human enhancement . Techno-moral
scenarios . Responsibility . Ethics . Public engagement
Introduction
‘Human enhancement’ (HE) has been labelled as the
intentional effort to improve individuals’ performance
with the help of technical or biomedical interventions
[1]. Far-fetched visions of HE may appear to be close to
science fiction, with stories about mind uploading, phys-
ical immortality, and mergers with artificial superintel-
ligences. However, exoskeletons, implants, and genetic
engineering are certainly contemporary technological
possibilities, which have already (or may have in the
near future) enhancing applications in sport, the labour
market, education and the military.
Beyond the practical outcomes of the current or hy-
pothetical applications, the logic of enhancement infil-
trates the representation we have of ourselves, our values
and aspirations. As long as enhancement becomes a
‘synonym’ of fulfilment, the exploration of human en-
hancement technologies cannot neglect that their trajec-
tories are inextricably linked to morals and social prac-
tices. It is not by chance, therefore, that HE has generated
a heated debate, which has often focused on the social
desirability and the moral legitimacy of the scientific and
technological means to achieve enhancements, or of en-
hancement itself. In this regard, critics have seen HE as a
violation of human nature ( [2, 3]), as a threat to equity [4]
or safety [5], ultimately characterising enhancement as a
force unleashed to disrupt society and polity [6]. On the
opposite side, the advocates of HE contend that enhanc-
ing individuals can give them greater freedom to shape
the life they want to live [7], increase their welfare [8],
and, ultimately, benefit society as a whole [9].
Despite its vivacity, this conflict over the characteri-
sation of HE has led to a stalemate, with little dialogue
between opposing camps. We could say that enhance-
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2technologies will have to be socially accepted and dem-
ocratically legitimated if they are to be brought to mar-
ket or even made available through public health sys-
tems, for instance, in Europe. The critics of enhance-
ment neglect the fact that enhancement technologies are
already in widespread use; depending on how enhance-
ment is defined, such technologies have been common-
place for centuries [10].
This article revisits the techno-moral scenarios
(TMS) technique as a potential contribution to over-
come this stalemate. The TMS approach was developed
to explore the interplay between technology, society and
morality. Focusing on new and emerging sciences and
technologies (NEST), TMS use narratives about hypo-
thetical future situations to explore and reflect upon the
possible moral consequences of technological change,
thus informing public deliberation on the desirability of
technological options.1 The approach that this technique
has to morality is descriptive, and its principal charac-
teristic is the recognition that morality changes over time
and that technologies are an engine of this change.
While it is certainly true that technological trajectories
are also oriented by morality and society, it is also true
that technologies regularly lead to moral and social
change. BWe constantly see NESTuprooting established
moral routines. These disturbances manifest themselves
as controversies about how to re-establish a ‘fit’ be-
tween NEST, our moral world and us. […] In this way,
NEST can lead to moral change, although it never
determines whether such a change will occur or the
direction of that change^ ( [12], 120).
The closure of controversies and the (re-)establish-
ment of this ‘fit’ marks the emergence of new Bmoral
regimes^ [11]. Moral regimes are constituted by
institutionalised practices, rules, and procedures in
which abstract moral principles are embedded. These
regimes define the positions and tasks, duties and obli-
gations, rewards and sanctions, of and for social actors
vis-a-vis their participation in the opening, unfolding
and closing of ethical controversies about new
technologies. In our view, Bmoral regimes^ essentially
describe ‘responsibility regimes’, insofar as they refer to
the institutional arrangements presiding over the as-
sumption and assignment of responsibility for the moral
consequences of technological transformations. This
view of moral regimes seems confirmed by the TMS
literature, which considers moral regimes as a particular
form of an Baccountability regime^, that is, the
institutionalised practices, rules, and procedures for
which the actors involved in science and innovation
are held accountable by their various (and changing)
stakeholders in society [13]. The notions of moral and
accountability regimes suggest that the alternative reso-
lutions of ethical controversies assume the form of spe-
cific institutional responsibility arrangements.2
The coupling between regimes and the closure of
ethical controversies depends on the fact that responsi-
bility arrangements are not morally neutral. For in-
stance, some of these arrangements can define respon-
sibility from a consequentialist perspective (what makes
someone responsible is the ‘quality’ of the conse-
quences of their actions), while others can take a differ-
ent stance based on virtues (what makes someone re-
sponsible is their moral character). A consequentialist
approach is likely to stress the dimension of account-
ability, whereas a virtue-based approach may emphasise
individual responsibilisation. In HE, these alternative
options can be translated in governance and regulatory
approaches that, for instance, are based, respectively, on
controls and sanctions, or on education and the self-
regulation of the social actors involved. This moral
relevance makes responsibility regimes participate in
the ethical controversies about new technologies. For
instance, to follow up on the previous example, an
approach based on controls and sanctions can be con-
sidered a threat to personal autonomy, whereas an ap-
proach that is based on self-regulation can be perceived
as ineffective in enforcing rule compliance or in
1 Boenink, Swierstra and Stemerding define morality as Bthe set of
values and norms that a specific community considers very important,
because they refer to legitimate interests, mutual obligations and/or
views of the good life. Although the precise boundaries of this set may
be contested, morality largely exists in the form of implicit beliefs,
routines and practices^. Morality is different from ethics, which is Bthe
reflection and debate on the relevance and status of (parts of) morality;
ethics, that is, is reflexive morality. […] [A]nyone questioning or
debating moral values and /or norms engages in ethical activity^
( [11], 3).
2 There is a second, narrower connection between responsibility and
the TMS literature. Stemerding [14] and Douglas and Stemerding [15]
use TMS in the framework of responsible research and innovation
(RRI). RRI is an approach to science and innovation governance
developed mainly in the European Union (EU) policy environment,
which pursues the alignment of research and innovation activities with
societal goals and needs by way of participatory approaches fostering
the mutual responsibilisation of science and innovation actors ( [16,
17]). In this context, TMS are used to foster the moral imagination of
researchers as a preliminary step to begin a dialogue with societal
stakeholders to explore the social and needs priorities that can be
responded to by research.
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3preventing undesired consequences. In other words, the
different definitions and regimes of responsibility may
contradict the moral principles and practices of one or
more social groups, or they can be considered insuffi-
cient to effectively translate specific value orientations
and moral beliefs into policies and actions.
A focus on responsibility, responsibility regimes, and
their participation in techno-moral change, is the origi-
nal feature of this article and its contribution to the
development of TMS. The goal is not to correct TMS,
but to complement this technique by addressing this
specific aspect, which was present and yet, in our view,
undertheorised in the original technique. For the sake of
clarity, we will refer to the expanded procedure we
propose as ‘rTMS’ to stress the continuity with the
original technique and, at the same time, to underscore
the additional element we aim to develop: responsibility.
Like their ‘parent technique’, the characteristics of
rTMS make them suitable to answer to questions that
address the nature and extent of the moral consequences
of new and emerging technologies, and the recurring
patterns of the public debate on these consequences and
their causes. In addition, they pay closer attention to the
interdependencies, alignments, contradictions, and con-
flicts between particular resolutions of ethical contro-
versies about new technologies and specific responsibil-
ity regimes. Like the original techno-moral scenarios,
rTMS address these issues from a descriptive point of
view. The point is not to define a set of specific ethical
standards to assess the ethical acceptability of HE tech-
nologies or of substantive criteria and procedural con-
ditions according to which the HE interventions can be
considered ‘responsible’. Like morality, responsibility
evolves and responsibility regimes are contingent on the
situation observed, including for aspects such as the
criteria that qualify somebody as ‘responsible’, the ac-
tors who assume or are assigned responsibility for some-
thing, and the means used to enact responsibility in
social processes and configurations. Following this line
of thinking, rTMS recognise the presence of multiple
moral standards that are unevenly distributed in society
and that can change, and do change, over time. They
appreciate that moral change involves controversy when
established standards and routines are challenged and
that the resolution of these conflicts entails the associa-
tion of alternative closures with specific responsibility
arrangements.
With their descriptive approach, rTMS provide an
alternative point of view on HE, which has the potential
to overcome the stalemate that often characterises the
public and academic debate. It does so by inviting a
focus not on the outright normative assessment of HE
technologies and by instead anticipating the possible
combinations and associations of morals, technologies
and responsibility. rTMS do not appraise different moral
standards, nor they assert predefined definitions of re-
sponsibility. They are instead a powerful tool to examine
the compatibility, consistency, and conditionality
of alternative technological options, moral standards
and principles, and responsibility arrangements. In do-
ing so, they can offer suggestions on the implications of
different technologies for moral and responsibility re-
gimes, the legitimacy of different responsibility arrange-
ments, and the limits and prospects for the mutual
adaptations of technologies and morals. In our view,
the improved understanding of the relations
between morality, responsibility, and technologies that
we can gain from applying rTMS, can foster our capac-
ity to outline the possibilities and conditions for building
robust moral and responsibility regimes for HE,
anticipating our future challenges and fostering the
imagination of possible solutions.
To illustrate the features and functioning of rTMS, the
main part of the article begins with a presentation of the
specific characteristics of techno-moral scenarios. Then,
the concept of responsibility is discussed and alternative
responsibility paradigms are described. Finally, these ele-
ments are combined, and the loosely standardised proce-
dure to run an rTMS exercise is described.
Techno-Moral Scenarios
The scenario technique is aimed to capture future dynam-
ics by elaborating alternative and hypothetical accounts of
future situations as well as the decisions and events that
allow one to move forward from the present to such
futures. They are not forecasts of the most likely future;
they do not identify the most likely pathway to the future
and estimate uncertainties. Rather, they describe different,
internally consistent, Bworlds, not just different outcomes
in the same world^ ( [18], 147), balancing plausibility,
consistency and multiplicity [19]. Unlike single-line pro-
jections and forecasts, they aim at conceptually
Breframing^ [18] our views of the future, challenging
entrenched assumptions, re-perceiving the environment
and discovering new strategic opportunities and risks.
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4This technique is not new to the field of science and
technology, and countless scenario studies have been
produced. This article focuses on the specific applica-
tion TMS. This technique has been designed to explic-
itly consider the normative aspects of the interactions
of science, technology and society. Normativity is not
new to scenario building. Normative scenarios have
long been developed to outline preferable futures and
assess the path that leads to such desirable future situa-
tions. They have Bexplicitly normative starting points,
and the focus of interest is on certain future situations or
objectives and how these could be realised^ ( [20], 728).
Normativity in scenarios goes hand-in-hand with
an inclusive approach to involving social and
organisational actors in the scenario-building process.
In normative scenarios, the word ‘expert’ has a broad
meaning. Participants in scenario-building can be
consulted either for their scientific or technical knowl-
edge on the matter that is examined or because they have
stakes in the decision-making process [21]. The role of
visions in the identification of a desirable future, the
importance of values in the analysis and building of
future reality, and the social responsibility of the futurist
are emphasised by the authors and studies that adopt
such a normative stance (for example, Barbieri Masini
and Medina Vasquez: [22], 51). Traditionally, the sce-
nario literature views the normative approach as the
opposite of an exploratory one. The former sets the
objectives to achieve in a future situation and defines
the conditions, actions and motivations leading to such
achievement. The latter projects expected futures based
on what we know of the past and of our present [23].
TMS blur this sharp distinction: they explore
normativity and make morality the subject of the sce-
nario exploration, examining the interplay between sci-
ence, technology and morals. As Swierstra, Stemerding
and Boenink explain, TMS address the Bmoral
consequences^, not the Bmorally relevant^ conse-
quences, of technologies. BThe latter do receive atten-
tion insofar many scenario exercises are im- or explicitly
normative, aiming at some common good.When [TMS]
focus on the moral consequences, by contradistinction,
[they] are not primarily interested in applying moral
standards to [new technologies], but in the opposite,
descriptive, question: how might the [new technologies]
affect current moral standards and practices? Of course,
these moral consequences will be of interest from a
normative, ethical point of view too, but it is important
to distinguish describing possible moral change from
evaluating it^ ([12], 121). An important element in the
analytical approach of TMS is therefore the focus on
technology and on how it leads to moral change.
Through the exploration of Bpatterns or chains of [eth-
ical] arguments: reactions and counter-reactions^ ( [11],
12), TMS examine controversies and conflicts and their
unfolding over time. This vantage point of observation
provides the opportunity to scan long-term moral
changes.
This dynamic perspective differentiates TMS from
other approaches aimed at assessing the moral desirabil-
ity of technologies such as ‘ethical technology assess-
ment’ (eTA) [24]. eTAwhich appears to mostly focus on
the assessment of a new technology according to a set of
categories and dimensions that are given analytical and
moral relevance either by the researchers or by the social
actors participating in the assessment. Therefore, BeTA
seems to work with a rather limited timeframe, taking
small steps at a time. Since morality usually evolves on
the long term, this method may have difficulty antici-
pating such long-term changes^ ( [11], 5). A second,
major difference between TMS and eTA involves the
acknowledgement that technology itself affects and
changes moral values. While the eTA approach also
acknowledges this influence, technology’s impact on
morality appears as a residual aspect, or at least as
only one element among many others.
TMS differ from other scenario approaches because
of this more sophisticated stance on morality and ethics.
Individual scenarios in normatively oriented scenario
exercises tend to be morally uncontroversial: they incor-
porate a definite moral stance, or definite moral stances,
and actions and behaviours are shaped accordingly. For
instance, two different individual scenarios on sustain-
ability can feature, respectively, two distinct situations
in which households can behave either in an environ-
mentally conscious or in a careless, eco-destructive way.
Similarly, a scenario on cognitive enhancement may
feature two different social actors, whose behaviour is
oriented by their opposite views of, say, pharmaceutical
enhancement. In individual scenarios, these positions
rarely change and we can learn about possible moral
controversies more from the combination and compari-
son of different scenarios, rather than from individual
scenarios themselves ( [11], 6–7).
The importance of focusing on the moral conse-
quences of technologies, and the rationale behind
TMS, is the increasing importance and scope of the
Bsoft impacts^ of new technologies, i.e., their influence
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5on culture, norms, beliefs, morals, and social relations.
These peculiar effects of technologies challenge the
traditional Bregime of accountability^ for technologies
and their management. In this traditional regime,
quantifiability, clear and noncontroversial harm and direct
causation are the specifications required for impacts to be
considered Bsufficiently ‘hard’ (in the sense of objective,
rational, public, and concrete) by technology and policy
actors to accept and allocate accountability^ ([13], 7).
However, the more pervasive technologies are and the
more Bintimate^ relationswehavewith them [25], the less
effective these criteria will be in determining their effects.
There are plenty of examples of these technologies, from
ubiquitous computing, sensors, implants and prostheses,
to mundane and omnipresent smartphones. These
Bintimate technologies^ display effects that are irremedia-
bly soft: qualitative, ambiguous, and/or indeterminate,
whose very identification is a matter of subjective defini-
tion and co-produced byusers themselves. The premise of
this difference is that Bin the case of hard impacts the core
normative question, that is: whether the technological
impact itself is indeed (un)desirable, is considered to be
answered already. As a result of this basic normative
consensus, hard concerns come with the expectation that
theycanbesolvedonthebasisofempirical facts^ ( [13],9).
Instead, the definition of soft impacts is enmeshed with
subjectivityandbasedondisagreementsaboutvalues rath-
er than uncertainty and ignorance about facts. They pose
normative challenges rather than factual ones ([13], 10)
and the logic of their management is based on trade-offs
rather than on containment, remediation strategies, or the
deployment of safety technologies [26]. The moral ambi-
guity of these intimate technologies Bgoes deeper as it is
caused by the destabilisation of the normative and moral
routines thatwe rely on to assess the (un)desirability of the
impacts of those technologies^ ( [13], 11). On this distinc-
tion between hard and soft impacts and the subjective
nature of the latter, HE is telling.While there is an unprob-
lematic consensus that HE technologies should do no
physical harm to thosewhochoose toenhance themselves,
the purpose of enhancements, i.e., why they should be
used, is subject to scrutiny and controversy.3
One of the critical aspects of reflecting upon future
technological developments and their impacts is the risk
of engaging in Bspeculative ethics^ [27], i.e., mistakenly
addressing hypothetical developments and far-fetched
visions of often implausible futures as if they were
actual situations [28]. To reduce this risk, techno-moral
scenarios invite constant reference to past ethical contro-
versies and to established tropes of ethical argumentation
to allow the anticipation of future ethical debates in a
sensible and controlled way. BTo keep the imagination of
the storywriter in check, [...] it is advisable to start from
existing historical and sociological knowledge of past
interactions between technology on the one hand and
society and/or morality on the other. This can be done on
several levels. First, we can start from patterns in the
unintended soft impacts of emerging technologies. Sec-
ond, we can use the recurring tropes and types of argu-
ments in ethical debates on new technologies. In addition,
finally it is possible to distinguish different rates of change
on different levels of society or morality^ ( [29], 58).
Incorporated in brief fictional accounts of future situa-
tions, techno-moral scenarios therefore describe the dy-
namic processes leading to specific moral and technolog-
ical futures and can be used to elicit the responses of
stakeholders with regard to their desirability, thus offering
Bcues for reflecting on the possibilities to intervene in or
prevent a certain course of events^ ( [29], 57).By focusing
on individual protagonists responding to specific situa-
tions (see our discussion of ‘personas’ in the Section titled
BExpandingTechno-Moral Scenarios^), scenario descrip-
tionsenable thepicturingof thesefutures inaBnon-abstract
and non-generalizing form[, helping] imaginewhat a nov-
el technology‘s impacts may look like on a very concrete
andmundane level. Howwill it affect the lives of individ-
ual people or specific groups in a variety of situations? [...]
This has two advantages. First, it enriches the imagination
of what the future might look like by adding details. In
addition, it invites theaudiencetoidentifywithoneormore
of the protagonists. This makes the future more vividly
present, and it may even evoke new perceptions of the
existing world^ ( [29], 57).
Responsibility Paradigms4
We might refer to TMS as the ‘parent technique’ of
rTMS. As we explained in the introduction, the latter3 BIt should be stressed that the distinction between hard and soft
impacts is not neutral or descriptive. Instead, it is a largely rhetorical
distinction brought into play by one group of powerful players
(policymakers and technology actors) for practical – or strategic –
purposes^ ( [13], 7).
4 This section is based on Arnaldi and Gorgoni [30]. See also Gorgoni,
in this journal issue, for a very similar, but not identical, description of
responsibility paradigms [31].
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6draw from TMS and try to complement them, introduc-
ing an explicit reflection on responsibility. In the intro-
duction, we described the extent to which TMS ad-
dressed the issue and we concluded that the reference
to responsibility is not absent in this technique. The
notion of a Bmoral^ [11] or Baccountability^ regime
[13] unequivocally refers to responsibility and to rules,
practices, institutions, in which it is embedded. More-
over, the scenario narratives produced in the context of
TMS necessarily discuss and describe the contingent
institutional arrangements that preside over the
assignment/assumption of responsibilities for ongoing
and prospective techno-moral change. However, this
topic has been largely left implicit and no specific
framework for its analysis and description has been
provided in TMS.
To define such a framework, we must acknowledge
that responsibility is more than a single concept; it is
Ba syndrome^ of related concepts [25], as several au-
thors have detailed (see, as examples, [32–35]). While a
review of these classifications is beyond the scope of
this article, we rely on Gorgoni’s work to examine how
the conceptions of responsibility have changed (see,
e.g., Arnaldi and Gorgoni [30]). This author developed
the work of François Ewald on the historical evolution
of responsibility to distinguish four Bparadigms^ for this
concept that can be useful in summarising and
contextualising the multiplicity of approaches to respon-
sibility. We briefly describe these paradigms in the par-
agraphs that follow.
The paradigm of fault corresponds to the traditional
moral and legal idea of responsibility arising from faulty
causation. This form of responsibility is based on the
moral (and legal) obligation of individuals to respond
to their faults. The liability of faulty agents can result in
their being subjected to adverse treatment (sanctions).
This model of responsibility is retrospective insofar as
responsibility is established by the assessment of past
actions according to a set of given criteria and rules.
The paradigm of risk replaces sanctions with com-
pensation. In industrial modernity, the idea of risk and
the mechanisms of risk management through insurance
effectively disassociated responsibility from fault and
(faulty) action, separating compensation from liability.
This view of responsibility relies on notions such as
event, victim and risk (calculation), which make the
agent’s contribution to the production of damage irrele-
vant for the compensation to be granted. In this para-
digm, the logic of compensating victims for the
damages they suffered prevails on the retribution of
the faulty agent. This responsibility paradigm places
on abstract calculations (risk assessment) and systemic
mechanisms (risk management and prevention) the bur-
den of adverse events and their consequences. As op-
posed to the paradigm of fault, here, responsibility is
disconnected from the moral qualities of the agent,
which were instead essential in the former. In the fault
paradigm, the actors are responsibilised by being ac-
countable for the negative consequences of their actions
and, because of the faulty nature of their behaviour, they
can be subject to retribution. The paradigm of risk rests
on the idea of social solidarity rather than individual
responsibility. Paradoxically, this shift leads to the de-
responsibilisation of the agents, as their contribution to
the production of the damage is irrelevant for the com-
pensation mechanism to operate. Moreover, this model
of responsibility is prospective insofar it anticipates the
probability of adverse consequences by means of risk
calculation and management. However, at the same
time, it remains linked to a retrospective logic in that it
anticipates the occurrence of damage but provides com-
pensation for a damage that actually occurred.
The paradigm of safety (Bparadigm of precaution^, in
Gorgoni’s article for this special section [31]) is centred
on the idea of precaution. The paradigm of fault assumes
an identifiable author or a discernible causal chain to
assign responsibilities. The paradigm of risk demands
the identification of a causal chain, which can lead to
events and not necessarily to an agent. The uncertainty
surrounding science and technology and their outcomes
challenges both tenets. The precautionary principle ad-
dresses this problem by framing responsibility as pre-
vention rather than ascription and subjection to sanction
or compensation. Precaution enters when the undesir-
able harmful consequences of scientific innovation can-
not be ruled out under the criteria of risk governance.
The precautionary principle creates neither new forms
of liability nor new criteria for risk assessment. Instead,
there is an emphasis on actors’ prospective responsibil-
ity: agency is reasserted, and responsibility is again
moralised. However, here, responsibilisation is predom-
inantly negative: the moral agent is required to abstain
from action to avoid (prevent) negative consequences.
Responsible research and innovation (RRI), the re-
cent governance approach for science and innovation in
the EU, can be viewed as an emerging perspective on
responsibility that creatively combines elements from
the three paradigms of fault, risk and safety, and
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7innovates them [16, 17]. Despite some differences, the
literature on RRI largely shares a common understand-
ing of responsibility and its dimensions [36]. RRI is
prospective such as the risk and precaution paradigms.
However, it does not seek to compensate or prevent the
negative consequences of innovation. It instead aims to
steer innovation and its outcomes and ensure that they
are aligned with societal needs and values. RRI aims to
be a driver and not a constrainer of research and inno-
vation, which means that the responsibility of social
actors goes beyond legal obligations and includes the
voluntary commitment to shape ethically acceptable and
societally desirable research and innovation trajectories.
Delivering on this commitment requires collaboration:
unlike liability and risk, responsibility is first and fore-
most mutual and shared across different actors with
different roles and powers throughout the innovation
process. Arnaldi and Gorgoni [30] maintain that this
original combination of features sets RRI apart from
other responsibility paradigms as it goes beyond the
traditional emphasis on fault and punishment, risk and
compensation, uncertainty and precaution. It aims at
steering the innovation process from the inside towards
societal goals rather than coping with its (actual or
anticipated) unwanted and unintended effects.5 Table 1
summarises the main characteristics of each paradigm.
As described above and summarised in Table 1, these
four paradigms are characterised by their temporal orien-
tation, the distinctive means they rely upon for enacting
responsibility, and the level on which imputation of re-
sponsibility is adjudicated (individual or collective). Tak-
en together, the paradigms offer an overview of the
conceptual diversification of responsibility and capture
the different positions of these paradigms with regard to
two opposite semantic poles that are always present when
responsibility is discussed, i.e., the opposition between
active and passive responsibility. Active responsibility
implies a deliberate will to take responsibility for some-
thing.We associate active responsibility with expressions
such as acting or behaving responsibly. Passive respon-
sibility refers to responsibility imputation, and it is asso-
ciated with concepts such as causality, liability, and
accountability. In general, it is fair to say that the different
definitions of responsibility oscillate between these two
poles. Among the paradigms, Gorgoni considers safety
and RRI to principally refer to an active conception of
responsibility as actors are expected to assume ex ante
responsibility for their actions, while the contrary applies
to the paradigm of fault, which is based on the ex post
imputation for the consequences of faulty behaviour. As
we have seen, risk is ambivalent, containing both ele-
ments of active and passive responsibility, as, on the one
hand, it seeks to actively anticipate the probability of
adverse events by means of risk assessment, prevention,
and management, while, on the other hand, it remains
linked to a passive logic in that compensation is provided
after responsibility is ascertained.
In the elaboration of the rTMS technique, we use
these four paradigms as ideal-types of responsibility, as
the references upon which Bresponsibility regimes^ are
modelled. We therefore maintain the descriptive per-
spective adopted by the original TMS technique to
discuss moral and accountability regimes; however, we
propose a more articulated framework to analyse and
describe the hypothetical responsibility arrangements
that can emerge in the wake of moral controversies
about new technologies, and as a consequence of the
disruptions they cause to moral principles and practice.
The following section illustrates how the procedure of
TMS can be complemented to add this explicit reflec-
tion on the dimension of responsibility.
Expanding Techno-Moral Scenarios: The rTMS
Technique
As we explained in the introduction, this paper attempts
to complement the TMS approach by explicitly consid-
ering the issue of responsibility in science and technol-
ogy. This section retraces the procedure defined by
Boenink, Stemerding and Swierstra to create TMS [11]
and adapts the steps they highlight to accommodate this
additional focus of attention. Again, it is important to
note that responsibility is already present in the original
design of TMS. Moreover, TMS have been used in the
context of RRI-related projects [14, 15]. However, this
article elaborates the reference to responsibility in order
to include the paradigms described in the Section titled
BResponsibility Paradigms^.
In rTMS, the four responsibility paradigms serve as
ideal-types of responsibility that can be used to sketch
5 We follow Gorgoni in naming these four responsibility paradigms.
However, this author has argued that the features of RRI reflect a
broader understanding of responsibility that is rooted in a specific
political-economic framework, namely neoliberalism [30]. The term
‘responsibilisation’ has been used to describe the definition of respon-
sibility typical of this political-economic context and might well be
used to label the fourth paradigm identified by Gorgoni [37].
Nanoethics (2018) 12:283–300 289
8different regimes, which correspond to them in terms of:
(1) active or passive responsible entities, i.e., the entities
(actors, artefacts, events) that either take or are assigned
responsibility and are subjected to (positive or negative)
consequences because of this assignment [38]; (2) tem-
poral orientation, i.e., whether responsibility is prospec-
tive or retrospective; (3) the means of enactment, i.e., the
arrangements in which the various characterisations of
responsibility are embedded.
According to the scenario logic, the paradigms can be
used to illustrate hypothetical situations, internally con-
sistent descriptions of the regimes presiding over the
assumption and assignment of responsibility for the
moral consequences of technological transformations.
In the mechanics of scenario-building, the paradigms
allow for the delineation and discussion of alternative
scenarios for responsibility. In the TMS literature, there
is no precise indication of the number of alternative
scenarios to be created. On this issue, Boenink says
Bscenario builders can decide to construct two (or even
more) closures of a specific controversy, after which
the future may diverge in different directions, and
alternative futures may be imagined^ ([29], 63). Our
proposal is to create four ‘raw’, alternative ‘responsibility
scenarios’, each of them based on a specific paradigm,
and to then revisit them to create alternative combina-
tions leading to the drafting of one or more final ‘meta
scenarios’ based on the consistent combination of ele-
ments from all of them (see Fig. 1).
As in the original TMS technique, the centrepiece of
rTMS is the use of vignettes. Vignettes are Bshort stories
about hypothetical characters in specified circumstances,
to whose situation the interviewee is invited to respond^
([39], 105). Vignettes have been used in sociology to
explore normative beliefs, as they allow researchers to
elicit situationally specific answers from respondents
[39] who are confronted with Bprecise references to what
are thought to be the most important factors in [their]
decision-making or judgment-making processes^ ([40],
94). Whereas, in quantitative survey designs, vignettes
are usually followed by a predefined set of answers, when
they are used in a qualitative context, their non-directive
nature causes them to resemble projective techniques in
psychology, allowing respondents to define the meaning
of the situation represented. The qualitative characterisa-
tion of vignettes Breorients research towards themeanings
respondents ascribe to situations, and accounts of discur-
sivepracticeand rhetoricalpositions. […]Questionsabout
validity, where a vignette’s ‘realness’ is understood in
terms of veracity (the closeness of its approximation to
reality), are replaced by questions about the meaningful-
ness of a vignette to participants in research^ ([41], 83).
Texts, videos, and audio have all been used as stimuli to
elicit respondents’ opinions [41]. All these types of mate-
rials have one thing in common: their narrative form.6
Techno-moral scenarios usevignettes as stimuli to encour-
age group reflection on the moral issues stemming from
specific developments in science and technology. Essen-
tially, vignettes are scenarios themselves as they narrate
hypothetical futureencountersof technologyandmorality.
Both written and videomaterials have been used.7
In the literature, the creation of techno-moral scenar-
ios follows three successive steps. First, the writers of
scenarios/vignettes Bsketch the moral landscape^ of the
future technology that is being examined with regard to
the technical feasibility of the developments that are
analysed. The active scanning of past controversies is
crucial in this phase of the process to establish similar-
ities and analogies for the considered hypothetical cases.
Second, hypothetical moral controversies are explored.
The promises and the objections to the creation, appli-
cation and diffusion of technical artefacts are examined
and contrasted to anticipate possible controversies.
6 For a general appraisal of vignettes in social science research, see
Hughes and Huby [42].
7 For an example of a video scenario, see, for example:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xGQ6Cp1dC4c (accessed
September 15, 2018).
Table 1 The paradigms of responsibility
Paradigm Guiding principle Means Target Dimension Temporal orientation
Fault Liability Sanction Negative outcomes Individual Retrospective
Risk Damage Compensation Negative outcomes Systemic Prospective/Retrospective
Safety Uncertainty Precaution Negative outcomes Collective Prospective
RRI Responsiveness Participation Negative and positive outcomes Collaborative Prospective
Source: Adapted from Arnaldi and Gorgoni [30]
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as analysis of past controversies, are used to generate
hypothetical evolutions. Potential closures of controver-
sies are generated. Third, the views and arguments listed
in step 2 are weighted, and plausible resolutions are
selected. The second and third steps can be rerun to
extend the analysis further in the long term (this proce-
dure is described in [13, 29]). To the best of our knowl-
edge, TMS use techno-moral vignettes as stimuli for
reflection; however, their development has largely
remained the task of the analysts. In the scenario-
building parlance, the scenario-building process is han-
dled by the researchers, while scenarios as products are
communicated to the public or to stakeholders as stimuli
for subsequent reflection.
The technique presented here largely follows the
TMS procedure, but departs from the original example
in a few significant ways. First, we structure a process
that can involve the public and stakeholders in the
creation of scenarios and not only in their discussion.
While this choice may be productive in terms of the
‘engagement potential’ of rTMS, it demands that a few
passages of their procedure are (loosely) standardised to
ensure their replicability in the context of scenario work-
shops. This loose standardisation includes the introduc-
tion of ad hoc questions and aids to focus the attention of
workshop participants on aspects that TMS originally
entirely leave to the expertise, creativity, and analytical
acumen of the researchers, such as the exploration of the
technological and moral landscape, as well as of the
promises about the impacts of technological options
and the objections raised against them. Second, we
consider responsibility paradigms and responsibility re-
gimes to be a complement to the original procedures and
thus add specific activities that refer to this aspect. The
following paragraphs illustrate the scenario-building
process as we have revisited it. Each step is described
and then summarised in a table, followed by an excerpt
from a mock scenario exemplifying the outcome of each
part of the process.8
Step 1 – Sketching the landscape: In the original
TMS technique, the purpose of this step is to delineate
the technological development to be discussed and to
chart current relevant moral beliefs, practices and
norms. Some historical background on both aspects is
also provided to present an overview of past related or
similar controversies and how they were dealt with [11].
For instance, an assessment of the current status and
future prospects of pharmaceutical enhancement in the
workplace can refer to past experiences with sport
doping.
If one considers the scenario narratives developed in
the TMS literature (see, e.g., [12, 13]), one can easily
find that an important aspect that is covered in this phase
of the process is the examination of the political, regu-
latory, and social context in which a controversy occurs.
This analysis is, of course, unavoidable, and scenario
narratives can hardly be exempted from exploring and
8 To conduct a rTMS exercise, the facilitator can use material aids and
tools, such as cards and a ‘game’ board, that can prompt and support the
conversation among the workshop participants. In this article, we do not
present these details for the sake of clarity and due to limited space.
Fig. 1 – Generating responsibility scenarios: an overview of the process
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describing these aspects. The Authors are well aware of
this dimension, and they explicitly mention the fact that
examining past social trends may Bsuggest specific path
dependencies in the development of morality^ and
Bmay be used to decide which developments are more
or less likely to be widely accepted^ ( [11], 10). How-
ever, as for responsibility regimes, it appears to us that
this element is barely discussed in the literature on TMS.
This different focus is presumably due to the intent to
underscore the emphasis on morality, thus differentiat-
ing techno-moral scenarios from other, less specific,
scenarios on the social impacts of technologies. More-
over, the researchers conducting TMS studies were per-
fectly aware of the way in which this social dimension
could be addressed in their work, and theymay not have
perceived the need to dedicate a specific activity to this
exploration. In rTMS, however, we assume that an
exercise can be run with lay people as a participatory
tool for creating scenarios. Therefore, for the sake of
clarity and to ensure that this aspect is covered in the
exercise, we think it is important to explicitly add the
‘socio-economic landscape’ to this initial, preliminary
prospection and provide simple guidance for its exam-
ination. With regard to the ‘socio-economic landscape’,
we refer to the macro-trends that set the stage for the
relationships between technologies and society, the spe-
cific practices in which technologies are embedded as
well as the social mechanisms through which values,
institutions and normative expectations are distributed,
solidified or transformed, such as institutionalisation
and socialisation.9
As a loose guide to defining such relations, we sug-
gest framing them according to two broad categories:
‘competition’ and ‘cooperation’. Competitive relations
describe the effort of two or more parties acting inde-
pendently to secure benefits or resources (competition
can lead, occasionally, to open conflict). Cooperative
relations denote actors working together for a common
purpose. The logic of using categories so wide is essen-
tially a pragmatic one and it has the primary goal of
ensuring both flexibility and minimal guidance for col-
lective discussion and reflection. Moreover, the distinc-
tion between cooperative and competitive relations is
significant in every context of human action; however, it
has a peculiar validity for HE, in which performance,
and performance augmentation, is a key issue. For
instance, competition in the economy and the profes-
sions may exert pressures on individuals and encourage,
or even compel, them to enhance themselves. Table 2
summarises this first step of the procedure.
Preliminary to this exploration of the landscape (or as
a Step 0, as one may prefer to say), we suggest to
develop a Bpersona^, a fictional character to be featured
in the scenarios. Personas are a technique used in the
field of human-computer interaction (HCI) design,
where descriptions of fictitious users are Bused as the
foundation for outlining a persona-scenario that
investigates the use of an IT system from the particular
persona’s point of view^ ([44], 58), thus generating
design ideas that are tailored to different user groups in
terms of requirements and fitness with the context of
use. Personas are used in scenario-building beyond
HCI; however, they do not represent the only form that
a scenario can take. We decided to use personas in our
scenarios as, in our view, this choice reinforces the
concrete, vivid and evocative nature of scenario
narratives: B[t]he intention behind the inclusion of
personas is very much in keeping with the narrative
nature of scenarios, to tell the story of a set of
individuals and the lifestyle choices they might make,
to try and personalise the scenarios and make them
more accessible, more tangible for decision and
policy makers^ ([45], 21). The characteristics of the
fictional protagonists will depend on the goal of the
exercise, and reflect the specific segments of the
population or the social actors considered by the
analysis (e.g., women, a specific profession, a distinct
industrial sector).10 In general, the use of personas can
contribute to the goal of conveying information in a
Bnon abstract, non generalizing form^ and is consid-
ered an asset of (techno-moral) scenarios ( [29], 57).
Table 3 lists the characteristics of the persona pictured
in the mock scenario.
The beginning of the scenario is an example of the
way in which the first step of the procedure can be
translated into a narrative of the future:
9 The distinction is based on the work of Talcott Parsons [43].
Socialisation refers to the incorporation of values and norms in the
psychological structure of individuals; institutionalisation refers to the
incorporation of select normative models in the social system of
incentives and sanctions.
10 Personas are built upon research data on users and, more generally,
social groups and strata. Due to the mock nature of the scenario
presented in this article, which was used for testing the procedure with
students, the features of the persona who is the scenario protagonist
were arbitrarily decided by the author.
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My name is Frans, good morning. Is it good,
though? Certainly, this morning was special. I
was summoned by my boss into her office. And
when she calls you, then you are in trouble. I must
say that after 15 years in the Financial Manage-
ment Company, I did not expect to be faced with
such a stark choice: being replaced by a computer
or becoming able to work like a computer.
Neural implants have been used for decades in
medicine. My father has one: he has Parkinson’s,
and, after he received the implant, he has been in
much better shape. However, this is entirely dif-
ferent. I knew that the financial industry had to cut
costs and that competition is fierce. Also, I knew a
few colleagues who were fired because of the
automation program, but I never thought I would
be told to have an implant placed in my brain.
We need to cut costs, we need to be more produc-
tive, but do we really need something in our head
to download the training? Do we really need
something in our head that stimulates our attention
all day long?
The brief text introduces the technology that is the
matter of discussion (a neural implant) in a mundane
situation, in which our protagonist is summoned by his
manager in a labour environment that is marked by
competitive pressures. Established medical uses of im-
plants are contrasted with enhancement ones, which are
discussed in the scenario.11 As it will be clear in the next
passages, these implants for brain enhancement are
available on the market.
Step 2 –Generating controversies: the second step of
the process explores the promises associated with tech-
nologies and the objections they raise. Like the previous
one, this phase closely follows the original TMS tech-
nique, and it is aimed at generating and discussing
potential ethical controversies about new technologies.
Promises about anticipated technological developments
are identified and described, and the moral objections
they may raise are listed and discussed. Generating and
discussing these topics can be difficult in a workshop
attended by persons with little or almost no knowledge
of the topic. Similar to what we did with the socio-
economic landscape in Step 1, we therefore tried to
identify and suggest some categories that can be
11 This scenario is based on the work of the students of the Galilean
School of Advanced Studies of Padova University (Italy), in which
rTMS were first tested in may 2017. The classroom discussion and the
scenario moved from the mission of Elon Musk’s start-up ‘Neuralink’.
The company plans to build a ‘neural lace’, a brain-computer interface
technology enabling bi-directional communication between the human
brain and computers. The goal of Musk’s venture is to allow humans to
run external digital devices and fast download and upload information
and data from/to computers to improve their cognitive performance in
areas such as memory and information processing. There are many
news articles describingNeuralink’s goals (e.g., [46]) and critiquing the
feasibility of Musk’s ideas (e.g., [47]).
Table 2 A description of Step 1: Sketching the landscape




feasibility and trajectories, areas of
uncertainty
Overview of current technological
options/artefacts
What are the features of the
technological
options/artefacts?
Moral landscape Values (abstract principles) > institutions
(general models of
behaviour) > normative expectations
(reciprocal orientation of actions)
Overview of the moral entities that are
relevant to the technological
options/artefacts that are considered










Overview of the socio-cultural trends,
constellations of actors, and institutional
mechanisms associating technical
choices and moral entities
How are technological options
and moral entities socially
organised?
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potentially useful to guide and stimulate the discussion
in the context of a scenario workshop.
Accordingly, we propose distinguishing promise in
twobroadgroups, describing twoopposite, encompassing
purposes of technology development. The first category
is called ‘protection’, emphasising the role of technology
in prevention and protection from threats, either physical
or otherwise. The second category is called ‘promotion’,
considering technologiesasconditions toprovidebenefits,
economic or otherwise. For instance, the development of
safety technologies is justified based on the promise that
they can keep us safe from environmental or even
technology-induced threats (for instance, radiation,
pollution). Conversely, enhancement technologies can be
designedandappliedbecause theypromise to improveour
performance according to disparate metrics such as
economic output, saved time from sleep, or cognitive
achievement. Of course, opposite types of promises can
be used to characterise the same technology. For instance,
in human enhancement, this happens when enhancing
neuroimplants are supported to improve our work-related
performance and/or as necessary modifications to save
human beings from irrelevance or worse in a world
populated by robots and artificial intelligence.12
With regard to objections, Boenink, Swierstra and
Stemerding [11] suggest that recurring argumentation
patterns and insights from the research on ethical, legal
and social implications of technology can be used to
formulate objections to these promises and thereby gen-
erate hypothetical controversies centred on issues such
as the desirability of consequences, rights and obliga-
tions, distributive justice, and conceptions of the good
life. For instance, arguments based on justice are central
in critiques claiming that enhancement will increase
inequalities. Moreover, the same authors emphasise that
controversies also feature a second, higher-order, level
that refers to Banother cluster of […] arguments that
does not deal directly with the new technology, but deal
in more general terms with the relation between techno-
logical and moral development^ ([12], 126). For in-
stance, a debate initially centred on the consequences
of a technology, for example, neurochip brain stimula-
tion, can turn into a debate about the deontology and
virtues of those who develop, and perhaps those who
sell such devices. Finally, Swierstra and Rip [48] also
refer to meta-ethical arguments, which capture different
attitudes to the ongoing adaptations between society and
technologies. These arguments can either consider
technology-induced transformations of society as inev-
itable or view this transformation as a form of corrup-
tion. This position presumes a definite, stable and
‘good’ state of individuals and society, which are grad-
ually or abruptly vitiated by technology.
Table 4 summarises this second step of the
procedure.
The second excerpt of our scenario illustrates how
this second step of the procedure describes the dialectic
of promises and objections.
They say my productivity will benefit from the
implant. I am told my salary will follow suit.
But I am not sure I will do it. They say the implant
is safe, but having it in my brain means I will
never be able to switch it off. I do not want to risk
overheating my brain. I need it!
Also, I have to pay for it, and they are damn
expensive. I have a mortgage, and I cannot spend
a whole lot of money on it, so who knows if the
implant I can afford will be reliable. And what
happens if there are malfunctions and I cannot buy
a new one or repair it? I would probably be fired…
The big bosses, their chips are paid for by the
company. The costs we are cutting are probably
paying for new, better chips, too. Theywill be able
to do all the work without employees if they
continue this way. What about us, those who do
not have such high salaries?
And after all, what would be the pleasure in learn-
ing and the satisfaction of doing a good job with
some effort?
I am not alone in having this opinion. The Euro-
pean Association of Financial Analysts sent a
petition to the Health and Industry directorates of
the European Commission and to the European
Parliament. I hope they will soon take measures
and protect and support us.
The promise of the neural implant (boosting work-
related performance and, as a consequence, the user’s
salary) is criticised on different grounds. First, its ‘hard
impacts’ are challenged: is it dangerous to the human
brain? Then, the objections quickly move to moral
12 This distinction has the same pragmatic logic as the differentiation
of cooperative/competitive social relations in Step 1.
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grounds, mentioning issues of distributive justice (does
the cost of the neural implant create social inequality
and an unfair disadvantage for those who cannot afford
it?) and of human identity (is it morally preferable to
perform work-related tasks with effort? Is this some-
thing that has to do with our human identity?). This
latter aspect introduces a different type of moral reason-
ing: while issues of safety and justice are treated from a
consequentialist point of view, this latter objection
establishes a link between individual effort, the moral
character of the agent, and the moral worth of his
actions. As explained above, focusing on single individ-
uals does not preclude exploring how such controversies
can be significant for society as a whole. For instance, in
this case, we speculate that a professional association
(the name we report is a fictive one) takes the concerns
of its members to regulators (it is of course an outcome
of the workshop discussion whether this hypothesis is a
plausible and relevant development of the controversy
that is discussed).
Step 3 – Closure and responsibility regimes: The
third step of the process explores the possible composi-
tions of the controversy and the regimes of responsibil-
ity accompanying these outcomes. Steps 1 and 2 define
the context and the controversy, completing what we
might consider to be a ‘baseline scenario’, sketching the
hypothetical technology examined, the social, moral and
ethical contexts and dynamics, and the possible
controversies surrounding the technological develop-
ments that are assessed. Step 3 complements the analy-
sis of techno-moral change described in Steps 1–2 with
the possible Bresponsibility regimes^ that preside over
the assignment/assumption of responsibilities for the
‘soft’, wider impacts of technologies. In this step, four
scenarios can be generated, one for each responsibility
paradigm (fault, risk, safety, RRI), representing the
‘pure’ ideal-types of hypothetical responsibility regimes
and systematically appraising the particular institutional
arrangements that enable and constrain specific solu-
tions to moral controversies. As we explained in the
beginning of this Section, three elements are explored
as they are constitutive of alternative regimes of respon-
sibility: (1) active or passive responsible entities, (2)
temporal orientation, (3) means of enactment. Drawing
from the TMS literature [19], we distinguish the means
in three categories: (1) technical (artefacts are changed
to incorporate moral objections), (2) moral (institutions
and normative expectations change to accommodate
technical artefacts), (3) socio-political (sanctions and
incentives are created to orient behaviour and technical
solutions).
The development of the four scenarios allows the
analysts or the participants in a rTMS workshop to
create an inventory of responsibility arrangements
that correspond to each of the responsibility para-
digms. These four ‘raw’ scenarios can be useful in
anticipating and systematically exploring the effects
of different responsibility regimes on techno-moral
controversies and their closing. As we stated in the
introduction, responsibility arrangements are not
morally neutral. Because of their moral significance,
responsibility arrangements are not interchangeable
in terms of their coherence and compatibility with
moral standards and principles. This systematic
exploration allows us to chart the plausible condi-
tionalities, alignments, conflicts, and inconsistencies
between moral and responsibi l i ty regimes.
BResponsibility regimes^ therefore fully participate
in techno-moral change, and they are not their me-
chanical outcome. The intent of creating alternative
responsibility scenarios is not to decide beforehand
the types of responsibility regimes that are relevant
Table 4 A description of Step 2: Generating controversies
Dimension Aspects Outcome Questions
Exploration of promises Reasons for the creation,
application and diffusion
of the technical artefacts
(protection, promotion)
Generating technical trajectories,
according to a principle of plausibility
What are the plausible developments
of the artefact that is considered?
Exploration of objections Objections and critiques to
the creation, application
and diffusion of the
technical artefacts
Exploring potential controversies
according to typified moral
argumentation (e.g., distributive
justice, privacy, good life)
What are the possible moral
objections and controversies?
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or legitimate but to determine the specific regimes
of responsibility that can be associated with differ-
ent moral controversies and their closure alternative
closures (see also Table 5).
The following excerpts of the mock scenario describe
alternative hypotheses relating to the different responsi-
bility regimes, each of which suggests a possible closing
of the controversy around the use of neural implants
for improving work-related performance. The following
paragraphs are brief examples of how alternative
scenarios for the fault and risk paradigm could be
developed.
Fault paradigm
I am particularly worried about the functioning of
the chip. It is not a medical one. Am I sure it works
in the same way? Now producers pay big fines if
their products are not safe, but the brain is yours,
not theirs. I know there are many who are suing
the producers in cases of product failure, and their
employers for making them work much longer
and with much fewer breaks than the product
guidelines require. I also know there is a consumer
association that gives them legal assistance.
It should at least be mandatory for the employer to
include this benefit in the employment contract, so
that one can afford safe, reliable implants. I guess
it is like dental care, and probably more important.
But the boss wants results, not happy employees.
It is not by chance that I know at least three
colleagues who took their chips and remained
silent, only to get better results in their evalua-
tions… As I said, I have a mortgage and I need a
job. So, never mind: I’ll forget my concerns and
I'll take the chip, too.
Risk paradigm
I am particularly worried about the functioning of
the chip. It is not a medical one. Am I sure it works
in the same way? I know that producers are
insured for malfunctions and they pay, but, after
all, you still may have your brain injured. They
solve the problem sending you the product
instructions, but that's theory, not the real world:
nobody tells them that the boss makes you work
for much longer and with much fewer breaks than
the product instructions require.
At least, the employer should include regular neu-
rological exams as part of the health benefits in the
employment contract, so that those who cannot
afford expensive implants can prevent brain inju-
ries. I guess it is like dental care, and probably
more important.
Table 5 Description of Step 3: Closure and responsibility regimes










Identification of the entities that take
part to the distribution of responsibility
in a specific regime
Who takes the responsibility to act for closing
the controversy? (assumption
of responsibility) - Who/what is
ascribed responsibility for the emergence
of controversy? (ascription of responsibility) -
Who is held accountable for the emergence of
the controversy? (subjection to responsibility)
Temporal
orientation
Identification of the time-orientation of
the responsibilities that are distributed in a
specific regime




Identification of the means that are used to
support specific responsibility assignments
and configurations: (1) technical (artefacts
are changed to incorporate moral objections),
(2) moral (institutions and normative
expectations change to accommodate techni-
cal artefacts), (3) socio-political (sanctions and
incentives are created to orient behaviour and
technical solutions).
What is the way in which responsibility is
realised enacted?
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But the boss wants results, not happy employees.
It is not by chance that I know at least three
colleagues who took their chips and remained
silent, only to get better results in their evalua-
tions… As I said, I have a mortgage and I need a
job. So, never mind: I’ll forget my concerns and
I'll take the chip, too.
This brief passage shows that a hypothetical fault
scenario may emphasise sanctions for the implants’
producers if they fail to comply with safety standards
or legal action to establish the liability of producers
and employers. As an alternative, a risk paradigmmay
focus on possible compensations for users in the case
of product failure or in introducing an insurance
scheme or a product guarantee for implants that fail
to function properly. Mandatory schemes for the em-
ployers to financially support employees who are
requested to buy the implants or who are willing to
monitor their health consequences may be instead
seen as an answer to the potential of the neural im-
plants to increase inequalities.
While the four responsibility scenarios describe ‘pure
ideal-types’ of responsibility regimes, it is unlikely that
different regimes (or their components) inspired by
alternative responsibility paradigms do not co-exist in
the real world. However, the various elements of
different regimes are not necessarily compatible
among them. For instance, one might argue that ad-
dressing sport doping from the point of view of the
RRI and Fault paradigms can lead to incompatible
solutions (e.g., voluntary compliance versus sanc-
tions). Conversely, arrangements based on risk and
precaution (risk and safety paradigms) or risk and
liability (risk and fault paradigms) can be compatible,
and they often are, for instance in the different treat-
ments of (legal) responsibility deriving from wrong-
doing or negligence.
Assessing these (in-)compatibilities is the last step of
the process, and it is aimed at creating one ormore Bmeta-
scenarios^ that incorporate the variations of responsibil-
ity arrangements identified in the four ‘raw’ scenarios in a
plausible and coherent combination. The logic of this step
is close to that of morphological analysis in scenario
planning. Morphological analysis systematically ex-
plores the relationships between alternative elements
and dimensions in a system to eliminate the incompatible
combinations of factors and create plausible and internal-
ly consistent configurations [19]. In rTMS, this assess-
ment has the purpose of designing more realistic respon-
sibility regimes, which can have a better adherence to the
trajectories that are more likely to develop Bwithout
succumbing to predictive claims^ ( [11], 10).
To exemplify this part of the process, our mock
Bmeta-scenario^ combines aspects from the risk (com-
pensation in case of product failure) and fault (sanctions
in case of company’s wrongdoing) paradigms.
Meta-scenario
I am particularly worried about the functioning of
the chip. It is not a medical one. Am I sure it works
in the same way? I know that producers are in-
sured for malfunctions and they pay, but, after all,
you still may have your brain injured.
I know there are many who are suing the pro-
ducers in the case of product failure, and they are
suing their employers for making them work
much longer and with many fewer breaks than
the product guidelines require. I also know there
is a consumer association that gives them legal
assistance. That’s good, but regulators should step
in more aggressively to sanction any wrongdoing,
from producers and employers alike.
It should at least be mandatory for the employer to
include this benefit in the employment contract, so
that one can afford safe, reliable implants. I guess
it is like dental care, and probably more important.
But the boss wants results, not happy employees.
It is not by chance that I know at least three
colleagues who took their chips and remained
silent, only to get better results in their evalua-
tions… As I said, I have a mortgage and I need a
job. So, never mind: I’ll forget my concerns and
I'll take the chip, too.
Concluding Remarks
This paper focused on the triad of morality, responsibil-
ity and technologies. The point of convergence of these
three dimensions is the elaboration of a technique for
creating scenarios that explore and anticipate their
co-evolution. This technique draws from techno-
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moral scenarios (TMS). Our goal was not to correct
the TMS technique but to complement it with an
explicit reflection on responsibility paradigms and
on responsibility regimes, i.e., the institutional
arrangements presiding over the assumption and
assignment of responsibility for ongoing and
prospected techno-moral change. We labelled this
expanded approach ‘rTMS’ and maintained the
descriptive and exploratory perspective of the
original method.
In the context of our reflection on responsibility and
human enhancement, we referred to TMS because they
were created to anticipate and appraise the ‘soft’ social
and moral impacts of new and emerging sciences and
technologies (NEST). The chief characteristic of these
soft impacts is their subjective definition, which causes
them to elude the traditional regimes of technology
assessment and management. HE technologies are cer-
tainly characterised by this type of impact. As they are
intended to reshape our very identity, and their promises
mostly concern the fulfilment of desires and aspirations,
the subjective nature of their effects, and of the corre-
sponding assessment, is indisputable. As we have
shown, this peculiar aspect of HE has led to a stalled
public and academic debate in which critics and advo-
cates argue either about the social and moral legitimacy
of the scientific and technological means used
for enhancement goals or about the legitimacy of the
goals themselves.
The descriptive approach of TMS to morality seemed
to us a way out of this impasse, and the logic of
rTMS follows it. This choice required a shift in
focus: no longer were we interested in elaborating a
set of moral standards or responsibility criteria ac-
cording to which HE technologies could be assessed
but rather we sought to outline a technique for ex-
ploring the alignments, contradictions and interde-
pendencies of or between HE technologies, morality,
and responsibility.
The creators of TMS framed moral change on three
levels [11]: the macro-level of abstract moral principles;
the meso-level of moral regimes, i.e., the institutions,
rules, procedures that translate principles in more con-
crete requirements; and the micro-level, which concerns
the discussions and negotiations in which moral issues
and practices are negotiated in contingent situations.
This paper’s framing of responsibility is also based
upon this tripartite model, distinguishing abstract par-
adigms, institutional arrangements (to which we have
referred as Bresponsibility regimes^), and the modes
in which responsibility is enacted in particular social
contexts and interactions. By using personas in sce-
nario narratives, rTMS aims to create a micro-level
entry point for analysing the three levels from the lens
of the hypothetical experiences of individuals,
representing ‘ideal types’ of social groups and actors.
However, it is clear from the article that our main
focus of attention is on the ‘regimes’ or arrangements on
the meso-level, which we identified as the site where
responsibility and morality meet. This choice is proba-
bly unsurprising, as this article is written by a sociologist
tinkering with morality and responsibility. Furthermore,
this emphasis is coherent with the practical goal of this
work: developing a participatory technique that is es-
sentially interested in pragmatically anticipating and
systematically exploring the institutional arrangements
shaping this encounter, in order to delineate hypothetical
moral and responsibility regimes which are coupled
with the ethical controversies around new technologies
and their alternative resolutions [12]. This work still has
a practical-normative significance, insofar as it fosters
our capacity to build robust moral and responsibility
regimes for HE technologies by systematically
appraising the transformations of morality and
responsibility.13
As we have said, our goal was to expand the reach of
TMS by developing in a more detailed and explicit way
the reference made by this technique to responsibility.
Combining responsibility and morality facilitates the
exploration of the relationships between these two di-
mensions. It is up to the reader to judge whether we have
succeeded in combining these two dimensions in the
rTMS procedure. Certainly, if we did, this result was
attainable within the narrow confines of this technique
and its application, while it was much beyond the scope
of our work to engage in a thorough conceptual and
theoretical understanding of the relationships between
morality and responsibility. This narrow and pragmatic
focus was a condition of feasibility of this effort; how-
ever, it nonetheless represents the main limitation of our
work, the further development of which would certainly
benefit from a more comprehensive approach.
13 While this article applies rTMS to HE, the application perimeter of
this technique is not limited to this subject and covers the ‘soft impacts’
of new and emerging technologies in general, rather than of specific
domains.
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Public engagement techniques are often open-ended,
and they are frequently modified to improve their func-
tioning.We hope rTMSwill not be an exception, and we
invite contributions and critiques that can strengthen not
only their practical implementation but the very theoret-
ical foundations on which they rest.
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